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1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 has brought to the surface the need of understanding
macroeconomic uncertainty as an important source of business cycle fluctuations. Since the
seminal work of Bloom (2009), the cause and impact of uncertainty draws more and more
attention in the economic research and has been studied extensively (e.g. Bachmann et al.,
2013; Baker et al., 2016; Caggiano et al., 2014; Carriero et al., 2017; Gilchrist et al., 2014;
Jurado et al., 2015; Ludvigson et al., 2016). Most of these studies construct novel uncertainty
measures for a certain country, based on a variety of methods. However, there is few research
that develops a homogeneous global uncertainty measure, and investigates the macroeconomic
impact of uncertainty in the global context.
Understanding the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty in the global context is extremely
important. First, consider the commodity market as an example, Kilian (2009) argues that the
roots of oil price fluctuations can be decomposed into three components: oil supply, aggregate
demand, and oil-specific demand shocks. Leduc and Liu (2016) further points out that the
uncertainty shocks are essentially one kind of the aggregate demand shocks. Meanwhile, given
the features of a world primary commodity, the price of oil is not likely to be determined by the
macroeconomic status of a single country, but rather be set by the overall global economic con-
ditions. Therefore, a global uncertainty measure is needed to understand the price fluctuations
of such an important international commodity.
Second, as noted by Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017), the common global component plays
a critical role in driving the time-varying uncertainty across the countries.1 Macroeconomic
uncertainty, even originated within one country, may have impacts beyond that country or even
its region. Such kind of spillover effects would not be captured in a satisfactory manner by
the existing methodologies unless measuring the uncertainty at the global level. Constructing a
global uncertainty measure to identify the spillover effect complements the conventional studies
that investigate the impact of country-specific uncertainty on business cycles in a particular
economy.2
1. The increased globalisation and trade openness are two underlying driving forces behind this increased
cross-country macroeconomic uncertainty correlations.
2. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) and Mumtaz (2018) also point out that, under property conditions, the
global uncertainty measure may serve as a underlying instrument for regional and country specific uncertainty
index. This is the key in addressing the exogenous problem in the research which investigates the uncertainty
impact.
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The first objective of this paper is to develop a homogeneous global macroeconomic un-
certainty measure. To achieve this goal, we compile a comprehensive dataset that contains 33
world major economies, covering both developed and major developing counties. The dataset
includes primary macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI, interest rate, and etc. The time
span is 1980 to 2016. We follow the classical econometric framework as in Jurado et al. (2015).3
This method measures macroeconomic uncertainty as the conditional variance of the unfore-
castable component common to a set of macroeconomic variables. The methodology, along with
the compiled abundant dataset, allows us to construct a homogeneous global macroeconomic
uncertainty measure.
After constructing a new measure of global uncertainty, we first analyze the basic property
of this measure, and then compare our measure to other popular uncertainty proxies. We
also reexamine the relationship among uncertainty and other key macroeconomic variables in
the international context. We further provide two meaningful applications of our uncertainty
measure. First, we pay a particular attention to tracing out the dynamic responses of oil prices,
given the global uncertainty shocks. By introducing the uncertainty in a simple but classical
Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) framework (Bloom, 2009), we uncover the dynamic
impacts of macroeconomic uncertainty on oil price. Second, we utilize our global uncertainty
series to distinguish the global and country-specific uncertainty shocks. The existing literature
has overwhelmingly discussed the dynamic impact of country-specific uncertainty shocks on a
specific economy (e.g. Bloom, 2009; Carriero et al., 2017; Jurado et al., 2015). By introducing a
new global uncertainty proxy, we are also able to identify the spillover effect of global uncertainty
shocks on a certain economy.
Our empirical results show that the uncertainty shocks have significant impacts on real
economic activities, even in the international context. In particular, the response of GDP and
unemployment to global uncertainty indicates a strong relationship. A one-standard-deviation
increase in global uncertainty is associated with a reduction in GDP of 0.2 percent and an
increase in unemployment of 0.1 percent. Our results are in line with the US-based research,
such as Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015), highlighting that the significant impact of
uncertainty shocks on real economic activity is not only a regional issue, but also a global
3. This method starts from the premise that what matters for economic decision making is not whether
particular economic indicators have become more or less variable or disperse per se, but rather whether the
economy has become more or less predictable; that is, less or more uncertain. See more discussions on the
method in Section 2.
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phenomenon.
Regarding the world commodity market, a one-standard-deviation increase in global uncer-
tainty triggers 0.15 percent decline in oil prices. Moveover, shocks in uncertainty account for
nearly 6 percent of variations in the price of oil, which is one of the most influential factors
driving the oil price movements, compared to other global macroeconomic factors. Our findings
are also robust when adopting the alternative analysis framework as in Kilian (2009). These
results show that global uncertainty plays a critical role in the price formation mechanism of
important international commodity such as oil.
Regarding the spillover effect, on the one hand, we show that holding the global uncertainty
fixed mitigates the impact of country-specific uncertainty on that economy. This finding provides
the evidence that the uncertainty measure generated by a single country’s data may reflect the
uncertainty shocks in both domestic and foreign economies. On the other hand, we document the
strong evidence of uncertainty spillover effect from world to an individual economy. All of these
findings point to the importance of distinguishing the global and country-specific components
when investigating the macroeconomic impact of uncertainty shocks.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, and most importantly, we construct a
new measure of global macroeconomic uncertainty. Our global uncertainty measure provides
an alternative aspect to capture the aggregate demand shocks as discussed in Kilian (2009),
which are generally difficult to measure in the empirical studies. This measure can be uni-
tized by many other studies. Based on this newly constructed global uncertainty measure, we
extend the traditional analysis of the impact of uncertainty on macroeconomic activities to
the international context, providing the further worldwide empirical evidence of the relation-
ship between macroeconomic uncertainty and real activities. Second, we answer two research
questions of particular interest. We investigate the price formation mechanism of world primary
commodities, complementing the research investigating the determinants of oil price movements
(e.g. Kilian, 2009). We capture the spillover effect of uncertainty shocks and distinguish the
global and country-specific uncertainty shocks, complementing the single-country studies such
as Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015).
Our goal to construct a homogeneous global uncertainty measure is related to a few of recent
pioneering works. For example, Berger et al. (2015) and Berger et al. (2017) estimate aggregate
uncertainty for OECD countries, with a particular focus on the information of the GDP and
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CPI. Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) investigates the common dynamics of uncertainty across
the OECD countries. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2014) evaluates the global realized volatility based
on equity price, exchange rate, long-term government bonds. Based on text reading, Baker
et al. (2016) provides a method to construct a global economic policy uncertainty. Ozturk
and Sheng (2018) constructs a world uncertainty measure from the Consensus Forecasts over
the period of 1989-2014. Our paper complements these research by not only utilizing a dataset
with much richer information set to construct a homogeneous global measure with a longer time
span and a larger country set, but also provides two meaningful applications to explicitly show
how our new measure can shed light on important research questions which are of particular
interest in the recent economic studies.4 Our work explores common macroeconomic uncertainty
that encompasses both developed and major developing economies. Provided the increasingly
important role of developing countries is playing in the world economy, this setting turns out
to be the key in investigating the impact of global uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the methodology and
data used for this study. Section 3 outlines the newly constructed uncertainty measure, and
provides empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Econometric Framework
A challenge in empirically investigating the behavior of uncertainty, and its relation to macroe-
conomic activities is that there is no objective measure of uncertainty.5 While most existing
uncertainty proxies have the advantage of being directly observable, their adequacy relies on
how strongly they are correlated with the latent stochastic process of uncertainty. Jurado
et al. (2015) proposes a method which measures macroeconomic uncertainty as the conditional
variance of the unforecastable component common to a set of macroeconomic variables. This
method ensures the econometric estimates of uncertainty as free as possible both from the struc-
ture of specific theoretical models, and from dependencies on any single (or small number) of
4. We provides the comparisons of our measures with other popular uncertainty proxies in the empirical
section.
5. The empirical literature has relied primarily on uncertainty proxies, such as the implied or realized volatility
of stock returns, the cross-sectional dispersion of firm profits, stock returns, or productivity, the cross-sectional
dispersion of subjective or survey-based forecasts, or the appearance of certain uncertainty-related words in news
publications. Bloom (2014) surveys the relevant works.
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observable economic indicators.
To construct the global uncertainty measure, we extend Jurado et al. (2015) to the multi-
country framework. Let Xt = (Xit, ..., XNt)′ generically denote the predictors available for
analysis. It is assumed that Xt has an approximate factor structure taking the form
Xit = ΛWi F
W
t + Λ
C
i F
C
t + eit, (1)
where FWt (F
C
t ) is an rF W × 1 (rF C × 1) vector of latent global (country-specific) common
factors, ΛWi (Λ
C
i ) is a corresponding rF W × 1 (rF C × 1) vector of latent factor loadings, and eit
is a vector of idiosyncratic errors. In an approximate dynamic factor structure, the idiosyncratic
errors eit are permitted to have a limited amount of cross-sectional correlation.
Let yit genetically denote a series that we wish to compute uncertainty in and whose value
in period h ≥ 1 is estimated from a factor augmented forecasting model with Fˆt ≡ (FˆCt , FˆWt )′
yjt+1 = φ
y
j (L)yjt + γ
F
j (L)Fˆt + γ
W
j (L)Wt + v
y
jt+1, (2)
where φyj (L), γ
F
j (L), and γ
W
j (L) are finite-order polynomials in the lag operator L of orders py,
pF and pW , respectively, the vectors Fˆt are consistent estimates of Ft, and the rw dimensional
vector Wt contains the squares of the original data to capture the potential non-linearities. An
important feature of our analysis is that the one-step-ahead prediction error of yjt+1, and of
each factor Fk,t+1 and additional predictor Wl,t+1, is permitted to have time-varying volatility
σyjt+1, σ
F
kt+1, σ
W
lt+1, respectively. This feature generates time-varying uncertainty in the series
yjt.
When the factors have autoregressive dynamics, a more compact representation of the sys-
tems above is the factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). Let Zt ≡ (Fˆ ′t ,W ′t )′ be a
r = rF + rW vector which collects the rF estimated factors and rW additional predictors, and
define Zt ≡ (Z ′t, ..., Z ′t−q+1)′. Also let Yjt = (yit, yjt−1, ..., yjt−q−1)′. Then forecasts for any h > 1
can be obtained from FAVAR system, stacked in first-order companion form
Zt
Yjt
 =
ΦZ 0
Λ′j Φ
Y
j

Zt−1
Yjt−1
+
VZt
VYjt
 , (3)
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Yjt = ΦYj Yjt−1 + VYjt,
where Λ′j and Φ
Y
j are functions of the coefficients in the lag polynomials in Eq. (2), Φ
Z
j stacks
the autoregressive coefficients of the components of Zt. By the assumption of stationarity,
the largest eigenvalue of ΦYj is less than one and, under quadratic loss, the optimal h−period
forecast is the conditional mean
EtYjt+h = (ΦYj )hYjt.
The forecast error variance at t is
ΩYjt(h) ≡ Et[(Yjt+h − EtYjt+h)(Yjt+h − EtYjt+h)′].
Time variation in the mean squared forecast error in general arises from the fact that shocks to
both yit and the predictors Zt may have time-varying variances, defined by
ΩYjt(h) ≡ ΦYj ΩYjt(h− 1)(ΦYj )′ + Et(VYjt+h(VYjt+h)′). (4)
We obtain the individual uncertainty as the expected forecast uncertainty of the scalar series
yjt+h given information at time t, denoted Uyjt(h). This is the squared-root of the appropriate
entry of the forecast error variance ΩYjt(h). With 1j being a selection vector,
Uyjt(h) =
√
1′jΩ
Y
jt(h)1j . (5)
To estimate macro (world-wide) uncertainty, we form weighted averages of individuals un-
certainty estimates for each series:
UGt (h) =
Ny∑
j=1
= wjUyjt(h).
A simple weighting scheme is to give series of each country the equal weight of their GDP
share. If individual uncertainty has a factor structure, the weights can be defined by the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the Ny×Ny covariance matrix of individual
uncertainty.6
6. We experiment both the GDP share and factor structure as weighting schemes to generate the global
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In the empirical section below, we adopt eight world factors of FWt , and one country-specific
factor of FCt for each country to estimate the FAVAR framework of Eq. (3). The choice of
length in FWt is selected by the information criteria proposed in Bai and Ng (2003), and the
order of FCt is restricted by the number of variables for each country. Note that our empirical
results are robust to the reasonable change of order for these factors. We include four lags
(p = 4) when estimating the model. This selection is supported by the careful inspection of
residual autocorrelation. Besides, including more or less lags would not have significant impact
on our estimates of global uncertainty. To concenrate our analysis, we only report the first
period ahead global uncertainty measures (h = 1) , which is also the most commonly discussed
and cross-comparable measure in the literature.
2.2 Data
To construct the global uncertainty index, we need a comprehensive dataset that covers the
major economies in the world. The choice of the starting date reflects our desire to maximize the
sample size in the time dimension, meanwhile, including as many countries as possible. Where
necessary, the variables are log differenced to induce stationarity. Finally, we standardize all
series used in this study.
Our dataset to construct the global uncertainty index covers the information from 33 world
major economies, over the time span from 1980Q1 to 2013Q3. We first adopt the latest version
of the Global VAR (GVAR) dataset.7 The construction of GVAR dataset is based on data from
Haver Analytics, the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database, and Bloomberg. It contains the primary macroeconomic indicators for each economy,
including real GDP, inflation, equity price, exchange rate, and short- and long-term interest
rates. Table 1 displays the set of countries included in our study.
uncertainty. These two methods generate very similar results. In the following empirical sections, we report the
results based on the GDP share.
7. The latest GVAR dataset, available from the GVAR Toolbox webpage, is prepared by Rodrigo Mariscal,
Ambrogio Cesa Bianchi and Alessandro Rebucci at the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC,
US.
8
TABLE 1
Countries in the Baseline Case
Asia and Pacific North America Europe
Australia Canada Austria
China Mexico Belgium
India United States Finland
Indonesia France
Japan South America Germany
Korea Argentina Italy
Malaysia Brazil Netherlands
New Zealand Chile Norway
Philippines Peru Spain
Singapore Sweden
Thailand Middle East and Africa Switzerland
Saudi Arabia Turkey
South Africa United Kingdom
Notes : Countries in our sample cover 90% of world total output.
We also enrich the GVAR dataset with the abundant dataset compiled in Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2017), which provides comprehensive quarterly data on eleven OECD countries.
This dataset considers data for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany,
France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan and Australia. For each country, the
data runs from 1960Q1 to 2013Q3. The dataset attempts to maintain a similar composition of
macroeconomic and financial series. For each country, the dataset includes real activity vari-
ables (e.g., exports, imports, consumption, investment, production, GDP), measures of inflation
and earnings, interest rates and term spreads, corporate bond spreads, exchange rates, stock
prices, and etc.8 In sum, we combine the abundant information from GVAR and Mumtaz and
Theodoridis (2017) dataset to construct a new measure of global uncertainty, which reflects the
comprehensive economic conditions covering both the developed and major developing counties.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Estimates of Global Macroeconomic Uncertainty
We present estimates of our global macroeconomic uncertainty measure in Figure 1, along with
the NBER US recession dates. In general, Figure 1 shows that global macroeconomic uncertainty
exhibits a countercyclical pattern to the US business cycle. For example, global macroeconomic
8. The appendix in Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) reports a full list of the series included and the data
sources.
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FIGURE 1 Global Macroeconomic Uncertainty Measure
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Global Uncertainty
Notes : We construct the global macroeconomic uncertainty measure by estimating the FAVAR model in Eq.
(3) with the data from 33 world major economies.
uncertainty shows spikes around the 1981-1982 recessions, the 1990-1991 recessions, and the
Great Recession of 2007-2009. However, we also document the distinctions between our global
uncertainty measure and the US business cycle patterns. For example, as expected, we document
a surge of global uncertainty during the 1997 Asian financial crisis period. These results provide
the first evidence to highlight the heterogeneity between the country-specific and aggregate
uncertainty, stressing the importance of constructing a global measure for uncertainty.
The dotted vertical lines in Figure 1 further indicate that the uptrends in global uncertainty
have coincided with important global events. For example, looking across all uncertainty mea-
sures overtime, the 2007-2009 recession clearly represents the most striking episode of heightened
uncertainty since 1980. The 1997 Asian financial crisis is a close second. The early 1980s reces-
sions are severe global economic contractions, which are also associated with a surge of global
uncertainty. Along with the major economic crisis, the major events such as the signing of the
Plaza Accord and the revolution of 1989 also relate to an increase in global uncertainty. More
recently, the slow down of economic growth in China has also triggered a rise in uncertainty in
the international level.
It is also of interest to compare our measure to other existing uncertainty proxies. These
uncertainty proxies have been discussed in detail in the studies such as Jurado et al. (2015),
10
FIGURE 2 Comparison of Uncertainty Measures
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Notes : The global economic policy measure in Baker et al. (2016) has a relative short time span.
Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017) and Baker et al. (2016). Figure 2 plots the standardized series
of these proxies, together with the our global uncertainty measure.9 Figure 2 shows that these
measures share strong commonalities in their long-run movements. For example, all of these
measures are clearly countercyclical. However, further analysis of these plots also indicates
a considerable cross-measure difference. For example, as discussed above, besides the recent
Great Recession, our global measure highlights the spikes of uncertainty that correspond to the
Asian financial crisis. In contrast, other measures mainly reports the dynamics of uncertainty
in developed countries, which fails to capture the uncertainty shocks in the developed countries.
To translate the graphical pattern into a statistical representation, we report the correlations
of uncertainty measures in Table 2. As expected, our global measure is more correlated with
the regional uncertainty measure of OECD uncertainty. Also note that, the economic policy
uncertainty measure differs the most from our measure. The reason for this may lie in how
these two measures are constructed.10
9. Note that the global economic policy measure in Baker et al. (2016) has a relatively short time span.
10. The global economic policy uncertainty measure is based on text reading, which calculates the appearance
of certain uncertainty-related key words in news publications.
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Table 3 further reports the summary statistics of our uncertainty measure, as well as other
indices. Table 3 also displays the first-order auto-correlation coefficient, and estimates of the
half-life of uncertainty innovations from a univariate auto-regression for each measure. The
half-life coefficient reflects the time required for a shock to reduce to half of its initial value,
which measures the persistence of the series. Overall, several statistical facts about the estimate
of global uncertainty stand out in Table 3. First, the global uncertainty measure is right skewed
and fat-tailed, which is line with other uncertainty measures. Second, global uncertainty shocks
are fairly persistent. The half-life of global uncertainty is nearly 8 quarters, which is less
persistent to the US but more persistent to OECD and economic policy uncertainty measure.
TABLE 2 Cross-correlation of Different Uncertainty Measures
Our Measure OECD Measure
US Macroeconomic
Measure
Economic Policy
Measure
Our Measure 1.00 0.61 0.44 0.23
OECD Measure 1.00 0.87 0.59
US Macroeconomic
Measure 1.00 0.44
Economic Policy
Measure 1.00
TABLE 3 Summary Statistics
Our Measure OECD Measure
US Macroeconomic
Measure
Min -1.60 -0.89 -1.22
Max 3.62 6.44 4.38
Skewness 0.71 3.61 1.81
Kurtosis 3.35 19.82 6.77
Ar(1) 0.92 0.87 0.94
Half Life 7.89 5.11 10.96
Our Measure
Economic Policy
Measure
Min -1.09 -1.25
Max 3.71 3.28
Skewness 1.46 1.03
Kurtosis 4.83 3.63
Ar(1) 0.92 0.81
Half Life 8.39 3.27
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Notes: Economic Policy Measure starts from 1997, which is relatively shorter compared with other uncertainty measures.
3.2 Global Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Dynamics
Existing empirical studies on uncertainty has often found important relationships between the
real activity and uncertainty proxies. In particular, these proxies are countercyclical and VAR
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estimates suggest that they have substantial impacts on output and employment given an in-
novation in these uncertainty measures.11 In this section, we extend these existing literature
to the global context. To achieve that, we first construct global macroeconomic factors. The
construction of global macroeconomic factors follows the strands of the literature that inves-
tigates the world business cycle (e.g. Kose et al., 2012, 2003, 2008). Second, we relate these
macroeconomic variables to global uncertainty, and investigate the dynamic responses of these
global macroeconomic factors.
We first plot the dynamics of the global factor series for each macroeconomic variable,
as shown in Figure 3. These global factors are generated by the simple principle component
method. We show that the patterns of each series capture the major global events. For example,
the trough of the stock series matches the major stock market crashes over the world. The
global CPI and interest rate has declined in the recent years, which corresponds to the great
moderation. The downtrend movements of global GDP series match the periods of economic
recessions.12
We now use a standard VAR model to investigate the dynamic responses of these key macroe-
conomic variables to innovations in global uncertainty. To do so, we estimate impulse-response
functions (IRFs) from a seven-variable model similar to Bloom (2009) and —henceforth, VAR-
7:13 
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.
Following Bloom (2009), we adopt the standard recursive method to achieve the identifi-
11. For example, in Bloom (2009), a key result is that a rise in some proxies (notably stock market volatility)
at first depresses real activity and then increases it, leading to an over-shoot of its long run level, consistent with
the predictions of some theoretical models on uncertainty as a driving force of macroeconomic fluctuations.
12. We also discuss the global factors which are generated only by the OECD data to avoid the outliers and
extreme movements for some developing countries. Overall, our results are robust to the alternative datasets.
For more discussions on this issue, see Section 3.4.
13. Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015) estimate a VAR-8 model for the US. We exclude wage from their
VAR-8 model due to a lack of consistent wage data across the countries. Note that when we experiment the
wage data of representative economy, such as the US, our baseline results won’t change both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
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FIGURE 3 Global Macroeconomic Factors
Notes : We adopt a simple principle component method to generate these global factors.
cation. Figure 4 shows the dynamic responses of major global factors. As expected, at the
global level, a surge in uncertainty triggers a significant decline in GDP. Meanwhile, there is
a rise in unemployment associated with the uncertainty shocks. These results are in line with
the empirical findings and theory on the uncertainty impact on a particular country, showing
the significant macroeconomic effect of uncertainty shocks. Figure 5 also plots the responses
of major financial variable, stock price, given the uncertainty shocks. We show that a one-
standard-deviation of uncertainty shocks triggers a 0.1 percent decline in the stock price. Our
finding supports the theory that the increase of uncertainty in general leads to a panic sentiment
in the financial market, which boosts the selling of the stock shares and thereafter decreases the
stock prices.
Table 4 plots the variance decomposition results. We show that global uncertainty can
explain around 10 percent variation of GDP fluctuations, and 8 percent of unemployment.
These results provide further evidence on the substantial role of uncertainty in determining
the world business cycle. Besides, Table 4 also shows that uncertainty shocks can explain a
significant fraction of variations for other global factors of interest such as working hours, CPI,
14
and interest rates.
FIGURE 4 IRFs of Global Macroeconomic Activities
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Notes : The solid dotted line represents the IRFs given the global uncertainty shocks. Shaded areas represent
68% confidence bands over 10,000 bootstrap repetitions.
FIGURE 5 IRFs of Global Stock Market
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TABLE 4 Variance Decomposition: Uncertainty
GDP Unemployment Hours CPI Interest  Rate Uncertianty Stock Price
Explained by:
K=3 8.940% 1.585% 3.210% 0.272% 0.324% 86.429% 2.809%
K=12 10.846% 6.628% 4.623% 1.750% 2.177% 64.566% 3.940%
K=40 10.919% 7.819% 5.006% 3.160% 3.636% 55.397% 4.466%
Table 4 Variance Decomposition: Uncertainty
Uncertianty
Notes : The symbol of ‘K’ denotes forecasting periods in variance decomposition.
3.3 Global Uncertainty Measure: Two Applications
3.3.1 Global Uncertainty and Oil Price
The relationship between the price of oil and the level of economic activity is a fundamental
issue in macroeconomics. At least since the first oil crisis in 1973, the macroeconomic effects of
15
oil prices have been studied extensively (e.g. Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Hamilton, 1983, 2003).
Although findings in the literature show significant variations, it is generally documented that
oil price has a significant relationship with real activity in the US and other countries.14
In the 2000s, along with the emerging literature on the impact of uncertainty on real activity,
strong oil price volatility triggers intensive debates in the literature on the possible drivers
of oil price (e.g. Kilian, 2008, 2009; Singleton, 2013). Although it is well documented that
both conventional supply and demand factors contribute to oil price movements, these factors
themselves have difficulty in fully explaining the dramatic volatility pattern of oil price (Kilian,
2009; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Peersman and Van Robays, 2009). This challenge stimulates the
assessment of the role of non-fundamental drivers, such as speculation and uncertainty, in the
literature, and uncertainty becomes a popular topic (Hamilton, 2009; Kilian and Murphy, 2013;
Singleton, 2013).
Among the literature investigating the price formation mechanism of primary global com-
modity, the seminal work of Kilian (2009) argues that the roots of oil price fluctuations can
be decomposed into three components: oil supply, aggregate demand and oil-specific demand
shocks.15 The aggregate demand shocks are usually difficult to measure in empirical studies. To
overcome this issue, Kilian (2009) adopts dry cargo single voyage ocean freight rates as a proxy
of the aggregate demand shocks. Leduc and Liu (2016) provides both empirical results and
a theoretical framework to show that uncertainty shocks are essentially one kind of aggregate
demand shocks. As a result, a question of particular interest is how the commodity price will
respond to one particular component of aggregate demand shocks—macroeconomic uncertainty
shocks.16
14. Policy makers are also interested in oil price movements because they have wide impacts on macroeconomic
aggregates such as economic growth, relative prices, inflation, income distribution, investment, production and
financial markets (Herrera and Pesavento, 2009; Montoro, 2012; Shi and Sun, 2017).
15. According to Kilian (2009), the last shock is designed to capture shifts in the price of oil driven by higher
precautionary demand associated with market concerns about the availability of future oil supplies.
16. Several mechanisms through which macro uncertainty affects oil price have been documented in the liter-
ature. One widely documented channel is that uncertainty changes the decision making behaviour of economic
agents (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom et al., 2007; Litzenberger and Rabinowitz, 1995; Pindyck, 1991), such as delay
in the production or consumption decision in the case of oil firms (Elder and Serletis, 2010; Favero et al., 2018;
Kellogg, 2014). There are a large literature providing both theoretical and empirical evidence on how uncertainty
affects the decision to invest and consume (Van Robays, 2016). For example, the option value to wait theory
proposed by Bernanke (1983) suggests that in the case of making irreversible decisions, investors might forego cur-
rent returns in order to wait and gain from more information that will become available in the future. Economic
policy uncertainty (EPU) is recognized as a key factor to affect real activity (Bloom, 2014), which further affect
oil price movement. Van Robays (2016) argued that uncertainty lowers the price elasticity of oil demand and
supply and thus higher macroeconomic uncertainty significantly increases the sensitivity of oil prices to shocks in
oil demand and supply. A less documented channel is that uncertainty increases the use of oil futures markets,
such as hedging instruments, resulting in less sensitive demand and supply to oil price changes (Baumeister and
16
In this section, we provide an important application of the global uncertainty measure,
and revisit the debates of key determinants of the real price of oil by using our measure of
macroeconomic uncertainty. We contribute to the debate on whether periods of steep volatility
are driven by oil supply and demand fundamentals, and estimating how much of oil price
variations is determined by uncertainty shocks. We first estimate the impact of uncertainty on
oil price in a typical macroeconomic economic model that includes GDP growth, inflation, and
etc. Then, following Kilian (2009), we also estimate an alternative structural model with the
consideration of world oil production, real price of crude oil, and global economic activity.17
We first augment the previous VAR-7 framework to analyze the impacts of macro uncertainty
on the oil price. We place the oil price as the last component, and adopt the recursive method
to achieve identification. This identification scheme is realistic since the oil price shocks are not
likely to affect the world real economic activities contemporaneously.18
The left panel of Figure 6 reports the dynamic responses of oil price given the global un-
certainty shocks. As expected, we document that macroeconomic uncertainty shocks have
significant impact on the oil price. In particular, the oil price experiences an instant decline
of 0.15 percent, which dies out quickly in the following 4 periods. These results confirm that
the uncertainty shocks are essentially aggregate demand shocks, and market participants may
reshape their beliefs when facing of an increasing uncertainty.19
The right panel of Figure 6 and Table 5 also present the variance decomposition results.
We show that uncertainty can explain nearly 6 percent variance of oil price movements in the
long run. Moreover, among all the macroeconomic factors, the uncertainty plays the third most
important role in driving the oil price fluctuations, only after the GDP and interest rate. All
of these findings point out the importance of macroeconomic uncertainty in oil price formation
mechanism, cautioning the future study to take uncertainty into account when investigating oil
price movements.
Peersman, 2012).
17. We also experiment the impact of uncertainty shocks on other important international commodities such as
raw material and metal. In general, the results are similar for these commodities. We report the corresponding
discussions in Section 3.4.
18. Our estimation results are robust to the reasonable changes of identification scheme. For more discussions
on this issue, see Section 3.4.
19. The negative correlation between uncertainty and commodity prices is also documented in some existing
literature. For example, Aloui et al. (2016) find a negative dependence between the equity and economic policy
uncertainty indices and the crude-oil return in their entire sample period.
17
FIGURE 6 IRFs and Variance Decomposition of Oil Price
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TABLE 5 Variance Decomposition: Uncertainty
Explained by: GDP Unemployment Hours CPI Interest  Rate Uncertianty Stock Price Oil Price
K=3 7.145% 1.280% 1.394% 2.216% 4.923% 4.714% 1.810% 73.401%
K=12 7.302% 2.333% 1.582% 3.336% 5.717% 5.500% 1.942% 69.197%
K=40 7.297% 2.626% 1.596% 3.735% 5.862% 5.683% 1.948% 67.869%
Table 5 Variance Decomposition of Oil Price 
Oil Price 
Following Kilian (2009), we also estimate a four-variable SVAR model as follows:
A0zt = α +
4∑
i=1
Aizt−j + εt, (6)
where εt denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations, and
the SVAR is based on the quarterly data for zt = (Δprodt, reat, uncert, rpot)′. Δprodt is the
percent change in global crude oil production, Δreat denotes the index of real economic activity
constructed in Kilian (2009), uncert refers to the global uncertainty measure, and Δrpot is the
real price of oil. Figure 7 plots the historical rates of these series. Following the Kilian (2009),
we postulate that A−10 has a recursive structure such that the reduced-form errors εt can be
decomposed according to et = A−10 εt:
et ≡

eΔprodt
ereat
euncert
erpot

=

a11 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 a43 a44


εoil supply shockt
εaggregate demand shockt
εuncertainty shockt
εoil−specific demand shockt

.20 (7)
Figures 8 and 9 report the results when adopting the Kilian (2009)’s framework. Our find-
ings confirm that the global uncertainty shocks, which is one typical of conventional aggregate
20. For more discussions on the validity of this identification scheme, see Kilian (2009). Our estimation results
are also robust to the reasonable changes of this ordering scheme. We report the corresponding results in Section
3.4.
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FIGURE 7 Historical Rates of Oil Market Variables
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FIGURE 8 Responses of Oil Market Variables:
under Kilian’s Framework
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FIGURE 9 Variance Decomposition of Oil Price:
under Kilian’s Framework
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demand shock, plays a critical role in determining the oil price movements. In particular, after
accounting for the supply and conventional aggregate demand factors, a one-standard-deviation
increase in global uncertainty leads to a 0.15 percent significant decline in oil price. Meanwhile,
the uncertainty shocks can again explain nearly 6 percent of oil price variances in the long
run. Moveover, the impact of uncertainty shocks is comparable to the conventional aggregate
demand shock, and is much stronger compared to the supply-side factors. All of these results
highlight importance of the second moment shocks, together with the traditional level shocks,
in the price formation mechanism in oil market.
3.3.2 Global Uncertainty Versus Country-specific Uncertainty
Recent literature has overwhelmingly discussed the impact of uncertainty shocks on a certain
economy (e.g. Bloom, 2009; Carriero et al., 2017; Jurado et al., 2015). However, another strand
of literature also documents that the globalization spurs the rising production, trade and fi-
nancial integration across countries and has triggered a common business cycle at global and
country group levels (Kose et al., 2012, 2003, 2008; Stock and Watson, 2005). The world
economies highly interact with each other, and therefore, the uncertainty shocks may transmit
across countries through these cross-country linkages. In this regard, Mumtaz and Theodoridis
(2017) provides the detailed empirical evidence of the commonly dynamics of uncertainty across
20
the countries, and constructs a two country DSGE model to capture the uncertainty spillover
from one country to another.21 However, most of uncertainty measure used in the existing
literature, which although is constructed based on the domestic data, fails to disentangle the
country-specific and global components in uncertainty shocks.
In this section, we explicitly examine the cross-country spillover effect of uncertainty shocks,
and utilize the newly constructed global uncertainty series to distinguish the global and country-
specific uncertainty shocks. To examine this question, we first construct the macroeconomic
uncertainty measure for the UK, and then investigate the interactions between the UK uncer-
tainty and global uncertainty. We pay a particular attention to the UK for two reasons. First,
the UK is a typical “small” open economy, which ensures that the macroeconomic uncertainty
shocks initialed in the UK are unlikely to affect the global uncertainty. This assumption is
adopted by many other studies (e.g. Canova, 2005; Mumtaz and Surico, 2009), and plays a key
role in our identification in the VAR model. Second, as a developed country, the UK provides
abundant macroeconomic data with relatively better quality across a longer time span.
FIGURE 10 Macroeconomic Uncertainty in the UK
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Figure 10 plots the estimated macroeconomic uncertainty for the UK based on the same
method of Jurado et al. (2015) as before. In general, this UK macroeconomic uncertainty series
can capture the major economic events of the UK, and is in line with the corresponding results
21. Some other literature also discuss this spillover effect. For example, using a SVAR model, Huang et al.
(2018) investigates the transmission of macroeconomic uncertainty between the worlds largest two economies and
find a unidirectional spillover of macroeconomic uncertainty from the US to China. Such spillover effects can be
explained by the intensive multilateral trade and the contagious monetary policies from the US.
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generated by Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2017). However, since we do not rule out the regional or
global factors at this stage, this UK macroeconomic uncertainty measure depicts the dynamics
of both OECD and country-specific uncertainty series in the UK, which are reported in Mumtaz
and Theodoridis (2017). This finding provides the first evidence that although the uncertainty
measure are generated by domestic data of a certain country, this uncertainty measure may still
reflect uncertainty shocks originated from both domestic and foreign economy.
FIGURE 11 IRFs of uncertainty shock on the UK
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In Figure 11, we experiment the empirical results employing our newly constructed UK
uncertainty measure. This kind of single country analysis is the typical exercise which is com-
monly adopted in the literature. Figure 11 plots the responses of major UK macroeconomic
indicators such as GDP, unemployment rates and stock returns given the uncertainty shocks.
As expected, we find that the responses of real economic activities are substantial. Meanwhile,
regarding the financial variables such as stock returns, we also document significant impacts of
the UK uncertainty shocks.
FIGURE 12 IRFs of country-specific uncertainty on the UK,
holding the global uncertainty fixed
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Notes : The blue line represents the IRFs when holding the global uncertainty fixed. We also report the results
in Figure 11 as the red line for the comparison purpose.
We now distinguish the global and country-specific uncertainty shocks. As a comparison to
Figure 11, we plot the responses of major UK macroeconomic indicators when holding the global
uncertainty fixed in Figure 12. This figure shows that after controlling the global uncertainty,
the effect of country-specific uncertainty shocks is in general mitigated, especially in the short
run. For example, we document a 0.16 percent decline of GDP given one standard deviation
22
uncertainty shock, compared to a 0.12 percent decline when holding the global uncertainty level
fixed. However, regarding the financial variable, we document the similar responses of stock
returns with and without holding the global uncertainty fixed. Overall, our results highlight
the importance of identifying the global components when investigating conventional country-
specific uncertainty impact.
FIGURE 13 IRFs of global uncertainty on the UK
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Figure 13 further plots responses of the UK macroeconomic variables given the global uncer-
tainty shocks. This figure investigates the underlying spillover effect. Apart from the country-
specific uncertainty, Figure 13 shows that the global uncertainty shock also has strong domestic
effects on both the real and financial variable for the UK. As a result, the documented overall
significant impact in Figure 11 can be regarded as a combination impact of both country-specific
and global uncertainty shocks.
3.4 Further Discussions
3.4.1 Alternative Country Set
One possible concern on our baseline results is that the global factors used in the Section 3.2
and 3.3 are generated by including both developed and developing countries, which may be
driven by the abnormal movements in the macroeconomic indicators of developing countries.
For example, the surge of the global interest rate in the 1990s may be triggered by the dramatic
increase of interest rate in Argentina in the corresponding periods.
To deal with this issue, we re-estimate the macroeconomic factors shown in Figure 3 based
on only the data of OECD countries. In other worlds, we are estimating the impact of global
uncertainty on OECD common factors. Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix present the main
results. As expected, the baseline results are robust when we adopt only the OECD factors.
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3.4.2 Alternative Identification Scheme
In the Section 3.3.1, we place the global uncertainty before the oil price, and assume that the
uncertainty shocks have an instant impact on oil price. However, one may argue that, as the
most important international commodity, the oil price movement itself may trigger a change
in global uncertainty contemporaneously. To address this concern, we experiment the results
by restricting the global uncertainty shocks can only have impact on all the macroeconomic
variables of interest after one quarter. Based on this setting, we are actually estimating the
lower bound of the impacts of global uncertainty shocks.
Figure A3 reports the results in the VAR-7 framework, and Figure A4 and A5 reports
the results under Kilian (2009)’s framework. We show that the global uncertainty shocks still
have significant impacts on oil price in this alternative identification scheme. Even under this
identification scheme, the uncertainty shocks can explain 2 to 3 percent variations of oil price
movements.
3.4.3 Comparison with Economic Policy Uncertainty
Another question of interest is the comparison between the macroeconomic effects of our measure
and other global measures. We adopt the global economic policy uncertainty, which is the most
popular global measure used to make the comparisons.
Figures A6 and A7 in the Appendix show that our results are in general in line with the
results generated by the economic policy uncertainty. However, we should note that the hetero-
geneity also exhibits. For example, the economic policy uncertainty is in general more related
to the financial variables. This is related to the way of constructing the economic policy un-
certainty measure. The text reading method can easily capture market sentiments during the
financial contagion period. In sum, all of these results show that our global uncertainty measure
can provides an alternative when we need to utilize the uncertainty proxy in the international
context.
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3.4.4 Global Uncertainty and Other Commodities
We also analyze the impacts of macro uncertainty on two other key international commodities:
agricultural raw material and metal.22 We choose the composite index of agricultural raw
materials and metals as commodity price measures, which contains the major exported and
imported goods such as rubber, cotton, iron, copper, and etc.
The left panel of Figure A8 shows the dynamic responses of the raw material price given the
global uncertainty shocks. We document a significant decline of raw material price immediately
after the uncertainty shocks, followed by a small overshoot and then a stabilization in the
following fifteenth quarters. The right panel of Figure A8 presents the variance decomposition
results. We show that uncertainty can explain approximately 9 percent variance of raw material
price movements in the long run. In Figure A9, we generate simulation results for the metal
price. Similarly, we document a significant decline of the metal price given the uncertainty
shocks. Figure A9 also shows uncertainty shocks can explain nearly 10 percent of the long-run
variance of metal price fluctuations. In sum, the results related to agricultural raw material
and the metal market are similar to those of the oil market. All of these results show that the
uncertainty shocks play an essential role in the price formation mechanism of world primary
commodities.
4 Concluding Remarks
Uncertainty is an extremely important economic concept and attracts more and more research
on this topic in recent years. By adopting a comprehensive dataset covering both developed
and major developing countries, we extend Jurado et al. (2015) forecast-error-based uncer-
tainty measure to the international context, and construct a homogeneous global uncertainty
measure. We compare this newly developed global uncertainty measure with other existing
macroeconomic uncertainty proxies. The global uncertainty measure developed in this paper
can be utilized in many other studies, serving as an alternative when one needs to identify the
uncertainty shocks at the aggregate global level.
Based on the newly constructed global uncertainty measure, we reexamine the relationship
among uncertainty and macroeconomic activities in the international context. The empirical
22. The agricultural raw material and metals price indices were both taken from the IMF’s Primary Commodity
Prices monthly data and subsequently aggregated to the quarterly frequency.
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results show that the uncertainty shocks have significant impacts on economic activities, even
in the international context. Our findings highlight that uncertainty shocks as a source of
business cycle fluctuations found in the literature is not only a regional issue, but also a global
phenomenon.
We also provide two meaningful contexts to illustrate how to apply our global uncertainty
measures. First, our global uncertainty measure provides an alternative aspect to capture
the aggregate demand shocks as discussed in Kilian (2009), which are generally difficult to
measure in the empirical studies. We show that macroeconomic uncertainty, together with
the aggregate demand shocks in level, are important in determining the oil price movements.
Second, our global uncertainty measure helps to capture the spillover effect of uncertainty
shocks and distinguish the global and country-specific uncertainty shocks, complementing the
single-country studies such as Bloom (2009) and Jurado et al. (2015).
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Appendix
A OECD Factors
FIGURE A1 IRFs of global uncertainty with OECD Factors
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FIGURE A2 IRFs of global uncertainty on Oil Price with OECD Factors
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B Alternative Identification Scheme
FIGURE A3 IRFs and Variance Decomposition of Oil Price:
Alternative Identification Scheme
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FIGURE A4 Responses of Oil Market Variables: Alternative Identification Scheme
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FIGURE A5 Variance Decomposition of Oil Price: Alternative Identification Scheme
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C Comparison with Economic Policy Uncertainty
FIGURE A6 Comparison with Economic Policy Uncertainty
GDP
Quarter
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Economic Policy Uncertainty
Global Uncertainty
Unemployment Rate
Quarter
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Economic Policy Uncertainty
Global Uncertainty
Stock
Quarter
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Economic Policy Uncertainty
Global Uncertainty
Oil
Quarter
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Economic Policy Uncertainty
Global Uncertainty
FIGURE A7 Comparison with Economic Policy Uncertainty
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D Macro Uncertainty and Other Commodities
FIGURE A8 IRFs and Variance Decomposition of Raw Material Price
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FIGURE A9 IRFs and Variance Decomposition of Metal Price
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